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First Transit v. Chernikoff, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 32 (Aug. 1, 2019)1
Tort Law: Common Carrier Liability
Summary
The Court clarified that (1) the heightened duty of care by common carriers only applies to
transportation-related risks, and (2) when a common carrier is aware of a passenger’s disability,
reasonable care includes providing safe transport that the circumstances reasonably require based
on the disability.
Background
Harvey Chernikoff was an intellectually disabled man who choked to death while riding
on a paratransit bus operated by First Transit. Harvey’s parents sued First Transit for negligence.
The Chernikoff’s claimed First Transit owed the highest degree of care to monitor and assist
Harvey while riding the bus. The Chernikoff’s claimed the bus driver was negligent for failing to
check in on Harvey and stop him from eating. In addition, the Chernikoff’s claim the bus driver
was negligent for how he rendered aid once he found out Harvey was choking.
At trial, the Chernikoff’s counsel stated First Transit owed Harvey a higher standard of
care than the highest standard due to Harvey’s disability. The jury was instructed that First Transit
had a heightened duty of care as a common carrier (“Instruction 32”). In addition, the jury was
instructed that a common carrier must provide additional care to disabled passengers when the
common carrier is aware of the disability (“Instruction 34”).
A divided jury found for the Chernikoff’s and awarded them $15 million. First Transit
appealed, arguing Instruction 32 and Instruction 34, which referenced a heightened duty of care,
was improper. Furthermore, First Transit argued opposing counsel caused prejudice based on his
use of the erroneous instructions during closing argument.
Discussion
First Transit did not waive its objections to the jury instructions.
The Chernikoff’s argued First Transit waived the objection of Instruction 32 because First
Transit proposed the instruction. The Court rejected this argument because First Transit did
initially argue the common carrier instruction should not be given. However, the district court
rejected First Transit’s argument and allowed the instruction. The Chernikoff’s then proposed an
instruction which First Transit objected to and in the alternative offered the Nevada pattern jury
instruction on common carrier duty.
Based on the circumstances, First Transit preserved its objection. First Transit did not
waive its objection simply because it sought an alternative after the district court overruled its
initial objection. Furthermore, First Transit did not waive its objection to Instruction 34 regarding
additional care to disabled passengers because First Transit did not propose the instruction and
properly objected when the instruction was proposed.
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The jury instructions misled the jury to rely on an inappropriate standard of care.
Nevada case law has historically imposed a heightened duty of care on common carriers to
its passengers.2 However, that heightened duty of care does not extend to protecting passengers
from non-transportation risks.3 The Court ruled Harvey’s choking was not a risk associated with
transportation, therefore the heightened duty of care was not applicable. Therefore, jury instruction
32 was improper because the Chernikoffs did not allege First Transit was negligent in its
transportation duties.
Furthermore, the Court ruled Instruction 32 caused prejudice because it affected the jury’s
ability to apply Instruction 34. Instruction 34 stated common carriers must provide the “additional
care which the circumstances reasonably require” to a mentally disabled person.4 While Instruction
34 correctly stated the law, the combination with Instruction 32 incorrectly led the jury to believe
First Transit owed a higher duty of care than just safe transportation from one location to another.
While First Transit works with the Regional Transportation Commission to accommodate disabled
individuals for transport, First Transit does not owe a heightened duty to prevent medical events.
Therefore, the Court ruled the coupling of Instruction 32 and Instruction 34, in addition to the
Chernikoff’s closing argument, misled the jury to imply First Transit had a higher standard of care
than it did.
Finally, while First Transit did have a duty to render aid to Harvey, the duty was not
heightened or extraordinary. There is no general duty to aid in Nevada however, common carriers
have a special relationship with passengers and therefore have a duty to render aid.5 However, the
duty to render aid is not extraordinary.6 The Court held the jury instructions improperly implied to
the jury First Transit had to do more than act reasonably under the circumstances when rendering
aid.
The jury may have found for First Transit if not for the improper jury instructions.
First Transit’s liability for Harvey’s death was a close issue which led to a split verdict.
The jury could have possibly found First Transit not liable had the jury instructions not misled the
jury to believe there was a heightened standard of care.
Conclusion
Instruction 32 and Instruction 34, in addition to the Chernikoff’s closing statement, misled
the jury into inferring a higher standard of care than one which was owed. First Transit does not
owe a heightened duty of care to passengers in non-transportation risks. Subsequently, the Court
reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded for a new trial.
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See Sherman v. S. Pac. Co., 111 P. 416, 424 (Nev. 1910).
See Rodriguez v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 400 So. 2d 884, 887 (La. 1981).
4
See Nevada Jury Instructions–Civil, 2011 Edition at 4.50 (citing Am. Presidential Lines, Ltd. v. Lundstrom, 323
F.2d 817, 818 (9th. Circ. 1963)).
5
Lee v. GNLV Corp., 22 P.3d 209, 212 (Nev. 2001); See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(1)(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 2019).
6
See Id. at cmt. F.
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